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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AS A MEANS TOWARD REVOKING
THE PUBLIC EDUCATION BENEFIT
M. Gene Blackburn*
Higher education in the United States the past two decades has
assumed proportions never before considered in the wildest imagi-
nation of the most optimistic prognosticator. Contemporaneous
with that growth is the phenomenon of student activism-involve-
ment, expression and dissent-a phenomenon which sharpens the
scalpel of the libertarian, taxes the patience of the conservative
and gives pause to the university administrator to ponder whether
he would have been more successful in some other form of en-
deavor.
The societal and administrative impact of such student ex-
pression has received considerable comment in the popular1 and
academic press 2 and in the law reviews3 Yet an administrative
impasse arises by attempting a definitional response between the
function of the internal administration of the public university,4 its
* Assistant Professor, Drake University Law School; B.A., J.D., Drake Uni-
versity. Research assistance by C. 0. Lamp, a senior in the Drake Law
School.
1 See, e.g., Molnar, D-day at Brooklyn College, National Review, Jan.
30, 1968, at 86-87; Crackdown on Protestors, Time, Nov. 10, 1967, at
54; Chaos on the Campus: San Francisco State College Suspensions,
New Republic, Jan. 6, 1967, at 14-15.
2 See, e.g., Brickman,Student Power and Academic Anarchy, School
and Society, Jan. 6, 1968, at 6; Langer, Students' Rights: They Should
Have More; Establishment Agrees, Science, Aug. 4, 1967.
3 "Public indignation, generated by expressions of protest and dissent
by students and faculty members which run counter to popular public
feeling, stimulates the urge to punish and suppress by any means
readily at hand. And what means are more convenient, swift and
effective than the simple expedient of throwing the ungrateful rascals
out?" Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CAIIF. L. REV.
40 (1966); Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process" 70 HAxtv. L.
REv. 1406 (1957); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State Uni-
versity Students, 10 U.C.L.A., L. REV. 368 (1963); Note, 1962 U. Ill.
L. F. 438 (1962); Note, 18 VmIm. L. REV. 819 (1964).
4 There seems to be little reason to attempt a distinction between public
education at the elementary, high school or college-university level
except to recall the compulsory nature of elementary education and
to suggest that the time consumed by the administrative process at
the elementary level may have some bearing upon the courts' atti-
tudes toward granting summary relief. See Madera v. Board of Educ.
of City of N.Y., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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taxpaying constituents, and the rights of the student. While trans-
gressions upon academic administrative authority have ranged from
such inoffensive conduct as petty insubordination to social protest
by means of four-letter expression, the result may be the same to
the expressive but recalcitrant student-a denial of the public edu-
cation benefit.7
At the risk of oversimplification, it may suffice to say that some
of the conflicts which arise from student activist involvement are
occasioned by the fact that the modern college student feels some-
how locked into a society which refuses to heed his drive toward
self-determination and which leaves him with no alternative but
to seek his own means of expression which sometimes transgresses
authority of the central administration. Administratively relevant
to this assumption is the question of whether or not he is also
locked into an administrative process which promises only pro-
5 "In large part, the confusion and misunderstanding between town and
gown in the context of contemporary student activist movements may
be attributed to a widely-held impression that the admission of a
student is a matter of grace or of privilege that, once extended, can
be recalled or revoked upon simple grounds of what appears to be
'best' for the university, of failure to conform to matters of custom
or of deportment, or for engaging in conduct 'unbecoming a student'.
It cannot be gainsaid that there is a fair amount of legal authority
that may be cited in support of the proposition that the discretion
of the school authorities to invoke even the most extreme academic
sanctions is limited only by such undefinable standards. For the most
part, however, these decisions have failed to make any distinction
between private and public institutions, they have been based upon
theories of express or implied contract, and that have either ante-
dated or ignored the flowering of the concept of due process. There
is good reason now to expect that the trend of judicial decision will
reject the notion that a citizen surrenders his civil rights upon enroll-
ment as a student in the university." Sherry, Governance of the Uni-
versity Rules: Rights and Responsibilities, 54 CArar. L. REv. 23, 25-26
(1966).
6 Compare Gleason v. University of linn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N. W. 650
(1908), with Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967).
7 The choice of the word "benefit" is occasioned by the conclusion that
it seems more appropriate here than other terms such as "largess,"
"conditioned benefit," "privilege," 'right," etc. See Goldberg v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). For the purpose of establish-
ing the federal court jurisdictional amount, it has been held that a
third-year medical student's interest is to be determined by the
value of the right to be protected. In this case, the value for the pur-
pose of jurisdiction was held to be in excess of $10,000.00 Connelly v.
University of Vt. & State Agr. College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
Compare O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with
Strings Attached, 54 CAns'. L. Rv. 443 at 446 (1966), with Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L. REv. 733 (1964).
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cedural safeguards in student discipline matters, without promise
of fulfillment of the education benefit. 8
As in other areas in which public sanctions are imposed upon
human conduct and where basic human values are relevant, seman-
tic attitudes have at times prevailed which have added little to the
definition of student rights.9 Notwithstanding this, no longer is the
public education institution justified in exerting autocratic discipli-
nary sanctions without reference to the procedural rights of the
student. 10 Of doubtful authority are the cases which have held
that public education is a privilege, the conditions of which the
student might accept or reject."- Yet the duty of the public insti-
tution has been defined:
Officials of the defendant school district have the responsibility for
maintaining a scholarly, disciplined atmosphere within the class-
room. These officials not only have a right, they have an obliga-
tion to prevent anything which might be disruptive of such an at-
mosphere. Unless the actions of the school officials in this connec-
tion are unreasonable, the courts should not interfere.12
The concomitant duties of student and faculty have also been
analyzed in relation to the pressures of activism:
[I]t is the responsibility of students and faculty to refrain from con-
duct that obstructs or interferes with the educational and research
objectives of the university, which impairs the full development
of the mutual process of teaching and learning or which imposes
restraints upon the advancement of knowledge. In part, these mu-
tual responsibilties are reflected in rules and regulations ordinarily
8 Compare Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), representing a major break-
through in defining the rights of a student to a hearing prior to sus-
pension. Dixon does not consider the sufficiency of the hearing, but
distinguishes those prior cases which did pass upon the sufficiency of
the hearing granted-all of which were in favor of the university-
with Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
9 Public education has been variously defined as a right, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); a privilege which the student
may accept or reject, Hamilton v. Regents of U. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245
(1934); Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir.
1959); and a conditioned benefit, Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal,
57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
10 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
11 Id. See also Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961); Madera v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 267 F. Supp. 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). But cf. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S.
245 (1934); Hanauer v. Elkins, 217 Md. 213, 141 A.2d 903 (1958).
12 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Com. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D.
Iowa 1966); Aff'd, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
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accepted as a matter of course, but which are now a target of
intense reaction that goes almost to the point of rejecting the
authority of the university to make any rules at all13
The subject of this paper alights upon the question of which is
the most efficient forum within which the attempt to resolve the
conflicts arising from imposition of the sanction of revocation of
the educational benefit by the university and the countersanction
by the student.
Many of the student discipline cases have become ensconced
in the administrative agency concept, an involvement which seems
to engender from a rule generally stated that colleges and universi-
ties should be relatively free in matters of self-determination.14
The freedom of the campus community is abhorrent to legislative
rule-making; and, therefore, colleges and universities must be free
to carry on their educational prerogatives free from outside inter-
ference, a privilege which has generally been honored by the
courts. 6 While schools and universities must enjoy the freedom to
solve their internal affairs within the gentle limits prescribed by
statute, one may question the extent to which the student must
submit to purely administrative jurisdiction of the public institu-
tion in matters of disciplinary expulsion.16 Questions, relating to the
time required to complete a university administrative appeal,17 of
judicial determinations which affect admission elsewhere, 8 of
'3 Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights, and Responsi-
bilities, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 23, 27 (1966).
14 See note 35 infra. Cf. Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agr. Col-
lege, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Lesser v. Board of Educ. of City of
N.Y., 239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1963).
15 See, e.g., Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agr. College, 244 F.
Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
16 Bridgehampton Sch. Dist. v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., 323 Mich.
615, 36 N.W.2d 166 (1949) where plaintiff claimed right to appeal
under judicature act. Held: State superintendent of public instruc-
tion is not a state board, commission or agency, but is a creature of
the constitution and a creature of the legislature which may provide
that his acts shall be final.
17 Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964).
18 The following statements are indicative of current administrative
attitude of some public institutions: "A transfer applicant under dis-
ciplinary suspension will not be considered for admission until a
clearance and a statement of the reason for suspension is filed from
the previous college. When it become proper to consider an applica-
tion from a student under suspension, the college must take into
account the fact of the previous suspension in consideration of the
application. Applications granted under these circumstances will
always be on probation and their admission subject to cancellation."
State Coll. of Iowa Bull., 1966-68 at 35.
"Students who for... disciplinary reasons are not eligible to re-
register in the college or university last attended will not be admitted
to the Graduate School." Florida State U. Grad. Bull., 1967-68 at 13.
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vagueness of standards,19 of exhaustion of administrative reme-
,dies, 20 and of combination of functions,21 interlineate the proceed-
ings and are of concern to the student who is attempting to retain
the educational benefit.
One may question the role of the agency concept in the
academic:
Perhaps we can use Dean Roscoe Pound's famous minority re-
port for a list of these mandates, even though his notions were vig-
orously assailed. First, there is a problem as to hearings. The law
requires a hearing in an adjudication. It requires a real hearing
of both sides of an issue, not a meaningless formalism. It forbids
adjudication by consultation when disputes are at issue. Next there
are problems of the separation of functions. The law does not sanc-
tion the combination of the roles of prosecutor and judge in one
person. There is also the problem created by the formulation of
policies beyond, or even contrary to, statutes. There is also the
major problem concerning findings of facts and conclusions of law.
The law requires that findings of facts be upon evidence, and that
conclusions of law be upon these findings. It does not countenance
preconception or unsupported assumptions as substitutes for cold,
hard facts spread upon the record. It forbids findings flitted to a
predetermined result or to a cause. Then there is the problem of
19 See, e.g., Board of Supv'rs. v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1958).
The legislature of Louisiana passed a statute requiring anyone apply-
ing to Louisiana State University to present a certificate addressed
to that institution attesting that the applicant was of good moral char-
acer. The certificate was to be signed by a parish superintendent or
principal. A companion statute made it a violation of tenure for any
high school principal found guilty of bringing about integration of
'the races. Held: the statute was void because it was an inadequate
standard. "This statute reposes in two named officials, a high school
principal and a parish school superintendent, the unfettered and un-
controlled power to grant or deny to a high school graduate the right
to enter a college or university in Louisiana. It sets up no standards
and expresses no outline of qualifications which are to guide these
.officials in the granting or withholding of the students' rights to go
to a state supported college or university.... How much less permis-
sible is it for a state by statute to say that a student must obtain the
,certificate of two named officials to entitle him to enter a tax supported
educational institution where no objective standard is set by which
the arbitrariness of the judgment of such officials in denying a certifi-
cate can be tested?" Cf. Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 161
F. Supp. 549 (E.D. N.Y. 1958) aff'd. 271 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1959). The
administrative standard under which Steier was suspended was "each
student obey all the rules, regulations and orders of the duly estab-
lished college authorities, and shall conform to the requirements of
good manners and good morals." (emphasis added); Packer Collegiate
Inst. v. University of State of N.Y., 76 N.Y.S.2d 499, 27 App. Div.
203 (1948) reversed 298 N.Y. 184, 81 N.E.2d 80 (1948).
20 See notes 61-63 infra.
21 See text accompanying notes 44-59 infra.
delegation to subordinates. Agency members can no more read the
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whole of all the records that come before them than can the judges
on the Court of Claims, which has the commissioner system of tak-
ing testimony. But the law requires that the result of an adjudica-
tion be reached by a system which assigns a definite role to the
person who hears the evidence and another role to the person ulti-
mately responsible for the decision. There can be no internal dele-
gations which depart from this procedural dichotomy. Finally there
is the problem of consistency. Iron-clad adherence to stare decisis is
not required, but the law requires that some attention be paid to
precedent. Agency heads can change their minds, but they cannot
willy-nilly treat one person in one away and another in a different
way.22
There are features within the university complex which dis-
tinguish that forum from most other state executive departments
which have adopted the administrative law formula. In the uni-
versity, most rule-making and administrative decisions relate only
to the internal administration of the university. Ideally the stu-
dents, faculty and administration are a partnership with one goal
in mind. Ideally the student is a part of, and not separated from,
the university. Ideally the student, faculty and administration
share the same goals-an intellectual exercise toward learning. If
this is the true purpose for existence, any adversary proceeding
whether inside or outside the administration building within that
setting seems somehow misplaced. The feature of pure inte--lism
clearly distinguishes other forms of government regulati. or
largess, such as licensing or public welfare assistance.23 In addition
there is the question of whether or not there is any clear legislative
intent to create the traditional agency machinery to handle such
matters. There have been suggestions which indicate a need for
isolation of the adjudicatory function because of the suspicions
which accompany decision making within the university, 4 suspi-
cions which relate closely to the human values involved in the
processes.
22 E. PRETTYmAN, TRIAL BY AGENcy 7 (1959).
23 Cf. O'Neil Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CAI.i L. REv. 443 (1966).
24 "At Berkeley these cases are referred to a faculty-student discipline
committee which holds a hearing and makes a recommendation for its
resolution to the Chancellor who almost without exception has followed
its advise. The availability of a hearing group independent of the
Dean's office is crucial for a number of reasons. First, it is capable
of using more formal (and thus more protective) processes for fact-
finding than is the Dean's office. , which seeks to avoid an adversary
character. Second, it permits the Dean's office to maintain its sup-
portive character-the committee, not the Dean, judges the serious-
ness of the case and the appropriate sanction. Third, its independ-
ence from the administration permits it to give content to general
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It is not to be here assumed that public school and college
administrators should not have the power or authority to impose
the sanction of benefit revocation.2 However, one may wish to
weigh the options which produce the most efficient method of apply-
ing the countersanction of retaining the education benefit,26 by ask-
ing whether the public education administrative procedures fit well
into the traditional rubric for applying the administrative process,
against the reasons which suggest the application of special time
tested procedural devices which make the administrative process
more desirable.2 7
regulatory norms which are more consonant with campus consensus
than might be the more isolated interpretations of an administrative
official. Finally, it can shield student transgressors from excessive
sanctions in those few cases where administrative officials are pres-
sured to take extramural factors into account 'for the good of the
university'." Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 54 CAiw. L. Rxv. 73, 76 (1966).
25 "The Regents have the general rule-making or policy-making power
in regard to the University... and are... fully empowered with respect
to the organization and government of the University,... including
the authority to maintain order and decorum on the campus and the
enforcement of the same by all appropriate means, including suspen-
sion or dismissal from the University." Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 at 468 (1967).
26 A basic and preliminary inquiry may be to determine whether or not
the administrative procedure is merely permisive or mandatory within
the meaning of the enabling act which creates the board of regents or
other statutory authority, and to determine whether the statutory
authority is sufficiently explicit to require adherence tothe adminis-
trative process. The former may relate to delegation of powers while
the latter may raise the question of exhaustion of remedies. Compare
Board of Supv'rs. v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958) with Baron
v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336 (3rd Cir. 1958). Cf. Due v. Florida A. & M.
Univ., 233 F.Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
27 See note 22 supra. "Among the most compelling reasons for the origi-
nal creation of administrative agencies, and as well for their expan-
sion and proliferation, is the fact that the regularly constituted courts
cannot always operate quickly where speed is essential; they do not
always perform efficiently in disposing of large numbers of routine
matters; and to some extent the courts do not have as richly varied a
panoply of sanctions from which to choose as do the agencies. This last
point might not at first seem apparent in view of the range of remedies
developed in Anglo-American law through the common law forms
and procedures, particularly as supplemented by the ingeniousness of
equity chancellors. Yet even equity judges have been bound by the
forms of law and the routines of judicial procedures, while the admin-
istrative process, from its dim beginnings in the exercise of executive
discretion, has consistently proved itself capable of greater inventive-
ness and larger flexibility than the courts." McKay, Sanctions in
Motion: The Administrative Process, 49 IowA L. REv. 441, 443 (1964).
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The public school and college disciplinary cases seem to be of
six distinct and well-defined types:
1. Those which take place without an administrative agency set-
ting.28
2. Those which have some semblance to traditional administrative
law concepts, such as delegation of powers, rule-making notice and
hearing.2 9
3. Those which have a semblance of the administrative concepts
because of the interpretation of a statute which confers broad
powers of self-determination upon the board of regents or other
delegated authority.30
28 Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 216, 263 P. 433, 437, cert. denied, 277
U.S. 591 (1928). Plaintiff was a young married student who was ac-
cused of serving intoxicating liquors in her home following the bar-
ister's ball (of all things). Her husband was accused of being the
campus bootlegger. The Montana court noted the legislative insuffi-
ciency in providing an administrative standard and said:
"In the absence of statutory provisions or regulations adopted by a
lawful governing body, the method to be pursued in determining the
necessity for the suspension of a student from the university rests with
the one who is charged with its immediate direction and management,
i.e., the president, and the courts will not interfere therewith, in the
absence of a clear showing that he has acted arbitrarily or has abused
the authority vested in him."
29 Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1959).
The administrative appeal procedure was provided by statute. See N.Y.
Civ. Practice Act, (McKinney 1963). Here the record indicates that
Steier was first suspended by the dean of students. He then appealed
to the president of the college, then to the faculty council of the col-
lege which referred the matter to a faculty committee, after which
the faculty council acted upon the committee's recommendation. He
then appealed for reinstatement to the board of higher education.
Upon seeking redress for his many self-imposed grievances in the
courts, the federal district court dismissed on the grounds that he
had not exhausted his state administrative remedies. Steier v. New
York State Educ. Comm'r., 161 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. N.Y. 1958). Upon
appeal to the Second Circuit, 271 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1959), the district
court decision was affirmed on other grounds, i.e., that education is a
matter of state concern and the federal court will take no jurisdiction
in the absence of a showing that there was discrimination because of
race, color or creed.
Judge Moore concurred on the grounds that student conduct was
a matter of administrative concern, and the court had jurisdiction, that
plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, but that the lower
court should be sustained on the grounds that the record simply did
not indicate that the plaintiff was entitled to relief.
Chief Judge Clark dissented, saying that the plaintiffs complaint
alleged facts sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on the facts and that
the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to
all persons, not merely those within chosen classes.
30 See Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
A Florida statute §240.04 provided in pertinent part: "The board of
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4. Those which appear to fill an administrative void by creation
of an ad hoc committee within the university complex to hear
disciplinary matters.31
control has jurisdiction over and complete management and control
of all the said several institutions, and each and every one of them...
is invested with full power and authority to make all rules and regu-
lations necesary for their governance ... to have full management,
possession and control of each and every of the said institutions and
every department thereof.., and to do and perform every other
matter or thing requisite to the proper management, maintenance,
support and control of each and every of the said institutions neces-
sary or requisite to carry out fully the purposes of this chapter...."
Pursuant to these broad powers the Board of Control adopted rules
relating to disciplinary action for "misconduct while on or off the
campus." The administrative rules also provided for appellate proce-
dure to the Board of Control "on all matters which the student feels
he has been aggrieved." (This section was repealed, however, by
Laws, 1963, Ch. 63-204. Enacted in lieu thereof by 1963 legislation is
§ 240.011 & § 240.042 which describe the legislative intent and the
powers and duties of the board of regents.)
Plaintiffs in the action attempted to obtain a preliminary and
permanent injunction in the federal court, claiming a violation of due
processs established by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, it was held that the plain-
tiffs had not availed themselves of the state administrative remedies
and the federal court would not impose prior restraint where the
administrative process was established and was orderly. Cf. Woody v.
Burns, 188 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1966).
s' See, e.g., Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
The California Constitution provides that "The University of California
shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing cor-
poration known as 'the Regents of the University of California', with
full powers of organization and government, subject only to such legis-
lative control as may be necessary to insure compliance with the terms
of the endowment of the university and the security of its funds."
CAL. CONST. A. ART. IX, § 9.
Goldberg and others decided that their most effective means for
social protest was by the publication of four-letter words. Whereupon
he was arrested by the civil authorities. He was also brought before
the disciplinary tribunal of the University of California, an ad hoc
committee created by the university administration. The ad hoc com-
mittee received its authority through a resolution of the Board of
Regents which read: "Implementation of disciplinary policies will
continue to be delegated, as provided in the by-laws and standing
orders of the Regents, to the President and Chancellors, who will seek
the advice of appropriate faculty committees in indivdual cases." His
action for mandate in the court, however, was in vain; the court
weighed the constitutional rights of the student under the conditioned
benefit approach as opposed to the administration's delegated powers
to make rules respecting the conduct of the individual student. The
experience of the University of California Ad Hoc Committee is por-
trayed in an empirical study reported in Heyman, Some Thoughts on
University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CAIaF. L. REv. 73 (1966).
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5. Those federal court cases where direct relief is sought under the
federal civil rights act 3 2 or other statutory or constitutional author-
ity.33
6. Those federal court cases which require an exhaustion of state
remedy in order to invoke federal court jurisdiction.3 4
The cases cited in this context indicate that by application of
the administrative process to school disciplinary cases the main
thrust is often focused upon questions of existence of notice and
adequacy of the hearing, rather than upon the more determinative
question of whether or not the student should be readmitted, a
determination which might otherwise be possible by imposition of
direct court action.3 5 Such a direction permits the application of
the familiar rule which induces the court to hold that the finding
of fact of the board is conclusive in the absence of fraud, corrup-
tion, oppression or gross injustice, and the court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the board.386
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (conferring original
jurisdiction on the federal district court for civil action arising from
violation of the act.)
S3 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 1950 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). St. John Dixon was arrested for
participating in one of the civil rights sit-ins in the South. He was
expelled from a state supported university and brought a direct action
against the Alabama State Board of Education, claiming an infringe-
ment of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held he was indeed entitled to notice and hearing, saying in
pertinent part:
"Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the
Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due proces of law.
The minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process
depends upon the circumstances and the interests of the parties
involved." Id. at 155.
Cf. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961);
Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
34 See, e.g., Ward v. Regents of Univ. System, 191 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Ga.
1957). Ward represents an earlier attempt than Dixon to invoke fed-
eral jurisdiction. Plaintiff first applied for admission to the University
of Georgia Law School in 1951. His application was denied. He ulti-
mately appealed "through the various steps pursuant to existing regu-
lations" and was again denied admission. He went to the service for
two years, then enrolled at Northwestern, then sought to enroll at
Georgia with advanced standing as a transfer student, relying, how-
ever, upon his original application. The district court required an
exhaustion of the state administrative remedies before federal court
injunctive jurisdiction could be invoked.
35 It would be naive to assume that the courts are willing to assume pri-
mary jurisdiction and few cases are found which are not precipitated
by a constitutionally protected right. But see, Tinker v. Des Moines
Ind. Com. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
36 See Lesser v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1963); cf. Rudolph v.
Athletic Comm., 1 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1960). Appellant was a matchmaker
538 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 3 (1968)
The foregoing observations are important only as indications
that the state legislatures, in providing for public education, have
adopted a laissez faire attitude toward expressly providing admin-
istrative machinery to deal with student expulsion problems. Thus:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American univer-
sities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual lead-
ers in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation.87
It is also indicated that the cases are often devoid of reciting
any clear legislative standard by which school and college officials
are permitted to impose sanctions upon student conduct.38 Although
this position is in keeping with a general legislative and judicial
attitude toward noninterference with university administration, (an
attitude which is obviously not unrequited by the university3 9 ) it
also points out an important legislative distinction between public
education benefit cases and government largess cases in other areas
of concern,40 such as public welfare assistance, where such rudi-
mentary questions as adequacy of standards to enhance delegation
of power may be raised in defense of imposition of sanctions at the
administrative level.41 However, if vagueness because of inadequate
in California who was served with notice of revocation of his license
under the California statutes. He claimed that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to sustain the findings of the board and that it was the duty
of the trial judge to independently weigh the evidence and to make
his own findings. Respondent claims that the athletic commission is
one of those statewide agencies whose findings must be tested by the
substantial evidence rule § 1094.5 (b) and (c) of the California Code.
Court rejects saying: "While legislatively created statewide agencies
do not have judicial powers without constitutional sanction in some
form and their rulings are subject to independent weighing of the
evidence by a court, that is not true of such agencies as are created
by the constitution and thereby given adjudicatory power or given
such power by the legislature in the exercise of a delegation of auth-
ority conferred upon it by the constitution." Id at-.
87 Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
88 See notes 40, 48, 49 infra.
39 See, e.g., Leser v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1963).
40 Compare statutes cited at notes 48 & 49 with Iowa Old Age Assist.
Law, § 249.11 (1966) (specifically providing for appeal, notice and
hearing upon failure of county welfare board to act upon application
for old age asistance and which provides for express sanctions by a
recipient whose old age assistance has been cancelled); Aid to Depend-
ent Children Law § 239.7 (1966) (providing for appeal, notice and hear-
ing to an applicant for aid to dependent children whose application
has been denied, modified, suspended or cancelled); cf. ILL. PUB. AiD
CODE, S.H.A. ch. 23 (1958).
41 While the issue of delegation of legislative powers may have lost its
importance in the federal courts following the decision in Schechter
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standards is present at the legislature-administrative level, the void
is not filled at the administration-student level where student rules
of conduct are often defined in the most general terms in the uni-
versity catalogue.2 Nonetheless, it should be noted that such an
appraisal tends to lose its validity if the question rests, not upon
whether there is adequate machinery to implement state action,
but upon the question of whether there is state action which ulti-
Poultry Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), it has been sug-
gested that it is still an important issue in the state courts. 1 K. DAVIS,
ADM IISTRATIV LAw TREATIsE, § 2.07; cf. Board of Supv'rs. of La. St.
U. of Agr. & Mech. CoIl. v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958), note
19 supra. See also Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power,
47 CoLum. L. REv. 359 (1947).
42 In Goldberg v. Board of Regents, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), the regents'
resolution contained the following language: "Implementation of dis-
ciplinary policies will continue to be delegated, as provided by the
by-laws and standing orders of the regents, to the president and chan-
cellors, who will seek advice of appropriate faculty committees in
individual cases." The stated policy of University of California in the
Goldberg case was: "It is taken for granted that each student.., will
adhere to acceptable standards of personal conduct; and that all stu-
dents ... will set and observe among themselves proper standards of
conduct and good taste." (emphasis added) The University catalogue
provided: "The University authorities take it for granted that a
student enters the University with an earnest purpose and will so
conduct himself. Unbecoming behavior... will result in curtailment
or withdrawal of the privileges or other action of the University au-
thorities that they deem wrranted by the student's conduct." (While
no one would seriously doubt that Goldberg did not act with proper
conduct and good taste, it would appear that the delegation in any
other context might be suspect.)
In Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., the standard that the
plaintiff transgressed upon was "each student shall obey all the rules,
regulations and orders of the duly established college authorities, and
shall conform to the requirements of good manners and good morals."
A random sampling of college catalogues reveals the following
examples:
"The university reserves the right to exclude at any time a student
whose conduct is deemed improper or prejudicial to the interest of
the university community." Florida St. U. Grad. Bull., 1967-1968 at 33.
'Persons enrolled... are held responsible for conducting themselves in
conformity with the moral and legal restraints found in any law-
abiding community. They are, moreover, subject to the regulations
of the student government under the honor code and the campus
code." Rec. of the U. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 1967, the N.C. Press at 55.
In Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963),
plaintiff was indefinitely suspended for violation of rule six, "miscon-duct while on or off the campus." This includes students who may be
convicted by university officials or city, county or federal police for
violation of any of the criminal and/or civil laws. The plaintiff had
been found guilty of contempt of court.
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matly catalyzes the right of the student to resist revocation of the
education benefit without reference to the administrative process.48
However, it cannot be gainsaid that the administrative proced-
ures, although for the most part judicially rather than legislatively
inspired, have not provided inroads to a limited definition of student
rights.44 Hence, while a court of general equity jurisdiction initially
may have been wont to interfere with the purely administrative
process of the school, college or university, yet once the rights have
been defined, a court may be inclined to recognize more freedom in
entertaining primary jurisdiction in such matters. 45 Yet, the ques-
tion of the proper role of traditional administrative procedures in
the school administration arena is not solved by reference to the
much criticized right-privilege-benefit trichotomy,43 for the reason
that "rights" as defined are rights only within the purview of con-
stitutional guarantees as to due process.47 Thus the question may
43 Compare Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963), with
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
44 Compare Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), with Hamilton v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
45 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Com. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971
(S.D. Iowa 1966).
46 Perhaps further distinctions should be made. When does a mere
privilege mature into a right? Compare Hamtlon v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) with Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). Is there
a distinction between granting the education benefit and revoking it
after it is once granted? Compare Leser v. Board of Educ. of City of
N.Y., 239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1963), with Madera v. Board of Educ. of City
of N.Y., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Is professional education,
once commenced, a "property right" for one purpose and not another.
Compare Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agr. College, 244 F.
Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965), with State v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171
S.W.2d 822 (1942). The author of Comment, 50 GEo. L. J. 234
(1961), states that the right-privilege-benefit fiction is reached by
a conclusion without regard to an analytical process and without
regard to the principles which support them. He suggests that there
should be an analysis of the purpose of the regulation or law; the
background of need which calls it forth; the scope and degree of the
sovereign need in calling it forth; and the effect of the statute or
administrative directive in furthering the state's interest. Cf. Note,
1962 U. OF ILL. L. F. 438, 450.
47 The right-privilege-benefit fiction is rendered useless where petitioner
can show an infringement upon a Fourteenth Amendment guarantee.
McNeese V. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 348 U.S. 886 (1954), per curiam; Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961).
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be asked as to whether or not the court should undertake a more
supervisory role and establish a more definitive rule in cases where
student conduct is motivated by drives which do not fall within the
ambit of constitutional protection,48 and whether or not proper leg-
islative distinctions should be made to protect the student from
improper expulsion by the university. Such a legislative distinction
has been suggested by a recommendation that:
A timely expression of the policy of the state would be to the
effect that state college and university authorities have the power
to formulate and enforce rules of student conduct which are appro-
priate and necessary to the maintenance of order and propriety,
considering the accepted norms of social behavior in the com-
munity; but that no rules may be imposed which place restrictions
on student conduct which are not reasonably necessary in furthering
the school's educational goals or which unduly restrict the freedom
of students to express themselves on matters of genuine social and
moral significance.49
But few legislatures have been so specific.50 Present legislative
expression ranges from silent assignment of university discretion to
the creation of more exact and identifiable standards for expul-
sion. 1 However, there is little ground to believe that a legislative
or constitutional provision which grants to the regents the power to
oversee the functions of the university would be declared unconsti-
tutional on these grounds alone,52 and if the view of one authority
48 Compare Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of CaL, 293 U.S. 245 (1934)
with Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961)
cert. denied 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
49 18 Vand. L. Rev. 819 at 825 (1963).
50 Ironically, the legislature of Arizona specifically grants to the Board
of Regents of the University the power to adopt rules for the control
of student traffic and parking, but is silent on the question of expul-
sion. See Amz. REv. STAT. § 15-724, 725 (1956).
51 Compare e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-5302 (1948), "The board of trustees
of the state university shall... be a body politic.., to elect.., a presi-
dent.., and such other officers... and prescribe their duties.., and to
make all by-laws necessary to carry into effect the powers hereby
conferred." with MAss. GEN. LAWS A-ro., ch. 75, § 3, (1958) "...the
trustees may adopt, amend or repeal such rules and regulations for
the government of the university, for the management, control and
administration of its affairs, for its... students... and for the regula-
tion of their own body, as they may deem necessary, and may impose
reasonable penalties for the violation of such rules and regulations...."
52 Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). But see
Board of Supv'rs. v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958). This case
has to do with the question of the admission of a student, based upon
improper legislative enactment which required certificates from a
high school principal and a parish superintendent and gave them
the "unfettered and uncontrolled power to grant or deny a high school
graduate the right to enter a college or university in Louisiana."
Id. at -
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is accepted, the lack of legislative standards to effect delegation is
not as important as the question of whether or not there are other
procedural safeguards which will prevent arbitrariness. 5
Rather than improper delegation of powers, the problem at the
college and university administration level seems rather to be one
of subdelegation of rule-making and adjudicative functions and of
vagueness of rules54 which are intended to guide student conduct.
Although there are few cases which dwell on either issue, a typical
fact situation of both is found in Woody v. Burns.5 5 Here the stu-
dent was accused of changing a basic record of the university when
he failed to enroll for an art course in the college of architecture
and fine arts. His case was heard by a faculty committee, but it
decided to exclude him on other grounds, that of "conduct unbe-
coming a University of Florida student." When he sought to re-
enroll, he was denied permission on grounds that his conduct was
disruptive in the class. The Florida court said:
We are not aware of the delegation by the legislature or the State
Board of Education or the Board of Regents to the faculty mem-
bers of any college of higher education system of this state to arbi-
trarily or capriciously decide who they desire to teach and should
such delegation be attempted it would amount to creating a hier-
archy contrary to all the fundamental concepts of a democratic
society. This is not to say that those charged with the respon-
sibility of operating our universities are not responsible for estab-
lishing basic standards of conduct and enforcing same on the
campuses of our state supported colleges and universities. On the
contrary it is their duty to take affirmative action to exclude from
the student body those individuals not conforming to the estab-
lished standards. However, the manner of enforcement must be by
53 "Assuming that the main objective is a workable system ... which will
protect against injustice or arbitrary action, the notion that protec-
tion lies in meaningful standards stated by the Legislature in advance
has hardly any merit. Protection lies in procedural safeguards and
in various outside checks upon discretionary power." 1 K. DAviS,
ADmn sRAT vE LAW TREATISE, § 2.08, at 107 (1958).
54 The classic example of vagueness is found in a private university case
where a young coed was confronted because she was not a "typical
Syracuse girL" Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231
N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928). Cf. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), note 40 supra. It is submitted that Goldberg's
conduct by its own terms is better defined than the standards to
which his conduct was applied.
In Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13, 14 (2nd Cir.
1959), one of the standards by which Steier was suspended was that
"each student... shall conform to the requirements of good manners
and good morals."
55 Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56, (Fla. 1966).
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a duly authorized body in accordance with procedures which permit
the student an opportunity to vindicate himself, if he can and so
desires.56
A basic issue which is not raised in the Woody case is the one
relating to the type of subdelegation which is sometimes permitted
in administrative law cases, that being the subdelegation to subordi-
nates to do merely ministerial acts and to fill in details. 57 By con-
trast, the subdelegation often found in education benefit revocation
cases is the delegation of the power to make rules or to decide
adjudicative facts.5 8 By and large this type of subdelegation has
gone unchallenged in the education benefit cases and the issue some-
times succombs to the general rule that the university has the
duty to concern itself with a student's activities as it effects the
welfare of the university as a whole and the university may make
such rules as are conducive to effecting that purpose, provided that
the rules are neither arbitrary nor capricious. But the void which is
created by failure to adopt legislative standards is seldom filled at
the administration level. It is true that disciplinary hearings must
start somewhere, and for various reasons these chores are often
shunted off from someone who has the primary responsibility. 9
Perhaps the reasons which underly the acquiescence of subdelega-
tion rests upon an assumption that a committee decision is for some
reason better than individual judgment, that there is a need to
create the aura of fairness and that a student's rights are best pro-
tected by first submitting the matter to a university or college
committee which is composed in part by the student's peers. 0
While this may be commensurate with a desire to isolate the ad-
ministration from the suspicions of an activist student body or for
the purpose of placating the student's demand for involvement in
university administrative functions, it may be wanting of appro-
50 Id. at 59.
57 1 K. DAVIS, ADmnmSTRAI LAW TREAISE, § 9.06 (1958).
58 See note 40 supra.
59 See, e.g., Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 54 CAiaF. L. REv. 73 at 75-76 (1966).
60 "When the misconduct may result in serious penalties and if the stu-
dent questions the fairness of disciplinary action taken against him,
he should be granted, on request, the privilege of a hearing before a
regularly constituted hearing committee. The following suggested
hearing committee procedures satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process in situations requiring a high degree of formality. 1. The
hearing committee should include faculty members or students, or, if
regularly included or requested by the accused, both faculty and
student members .... " Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of
Students, 53 A.A.U.P. Bull. 53 Winter 1967 at 368.
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priate precedent to sustain it. 61 Neither does that assumption prove
that fairness will exist because of student inclusion on the hearing
committee. Nor does it escape the reality that the ultimate decision
of revocation or nonrevocation must ultimately remain with the
chief administrative functionary of the college or university. It is in
this transition of functions where the ultimate danger lies that the
decision of the superior may in fact be the decision of the subordi-
nate.6
The pragmatic difficulty that a student faces, however, is to
convince a court to entertain jurisdiction of his case when his status
or his conduct is such that he cannot engender a question which is
under the cover of the constitutional umbrella. The cases which
typify the problem are of three types: those fedral court cases in
which the courts have either avoided the problem as presenting
questions wholly within the function of the state courts, 3 those
federal court cases in which the court was not required to pass upon
substantive issues because of the aggrieved party's failure to ex-
haust his state administrative remedies, 64 and those state court
decisions which suggest that the academic community should re-
main sacrosanct and beyond the pale of judicial supervision. 5 With
reference to the administrative law question of exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, there appear to be reasons which both sustain
and oppose the judicial position. In those cases which have consid-
ered the matter and which have rejected jurisdiction based upon
failure to exhaust, the state statutes have been reasonably specific
in delegating authority to the boards in control of education.6 In
61 But cf., cases involving subdelegation of legislative or adjudicative
functions in other administrative areas. English v. City of Long Beach,
209 P.2d 403 (Cal. 1949) (Dismissal of a policeman); State v. Rifleman,
203 Okla. 294, 220 P.2d 441 (1950) (Suspension of a dentist from prac-
tice); State v. City of Seattle, 61 Wash.2d 658, 379 P.2d 925 (1963)
(Discharge of a public employee); Ledgering v. State, 63 Wash. 2d 94,
385 P.2d 522 (1963) (Suspension of driver's license).
62 "What happens in fact is that the line between exercise of independent
judgment by the superior and reliance by the superior on the judg-
ment of the subordinate becomes impossible to locate." 1 K. DAvis,
AiMI ~sTRATivE LAW TREATISE, § 9.06 at 636 (1958). "At Berkeley these
cases are referred to a faculty-student discipline committee which
holds a hearing and makes a recommendation for its resolution to the
Chancellor who almost without exception has followed its advise."
Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54
CAMF. L. REV. 73, 76 (1966).
63 See Steier note 27 supra.
64 See Due note 28 supra.
65 See note 34 supra.
66 See notes 27-28 supra.
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some the boards prescribed rules which included appeal proced-
ures. In addition, correct distinction is made between those cases
which prohibit direct federal court action while applying an admin-
istrative, rather than a judicial remedy.67 On the other hand, none
of the cases distinguishes between dissent and behavior, a question
which demands clarification and which could be important in deter-
mining whether or not primary jurisdiction will be assumed. In
addition, the cases do not consider whether or not exhaustion would
have availed the student of an adequate remedy.68 None of the
cases sufficiently considers and distinguishes the unique position of
the student in relation to the university and with relation to the
administrative process within the university.69 None suggests that
the typical student is without funds to sustain a long and arduous
appeal from a suspension order by dean of students to the president
of the college, to faculty committee, to the faculty council, to the
board of education, to the commissioner of education and then
through the courts.70 None suggests that the student can afford
neither an attorney to develop an adequate record at all stages of
the proceedings nor that the student can seldom afford the cost of
a transcript to make an adequate appellate record7 ' and that failure
67 Compare Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2nd
Cir. 1959), with Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336 (3rd Cir. 1958)
wherein it is said, "There is no longer any doubt that where a person's
federally-protected civil or constitutional rights are abridged, resort to
a federal court may be had without first exhausting the judicial reme-
dies of state courts.... If, however, the state court in fact is applying
an administrative rather than a judicial remedy, resort must first be
had to the state court before suit can be brought in the federal court."
Id. at 337.
68 See 3 K. DAvs, ADMvIsTmATivx LAw TRF ATSE § 20.07 at 99, § 2010 at
115 (1958).
09 See e.g., Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, (D.D.C. 1957), where
the plaintiff was threatened with disbarment from the Securities
Exchange Commision and brought action for temporary injunction
and temporary restraining order, and it was held that judicial inter-
vention was proper where plaintiff could show "that his case does
present an exceptional situation in which the court has jurisdiction
to determine the purely legal question of the Commission's authority
to maintain the pending disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff,
without requiring him to exhaust his administrative remedies, because
of the peculiar delicacy of an attorney's good reputation, his chief
asset is his profession, and the fact that some members of the public
may assume guilt from disbarment proceedings despite final exonera-
tion." Id. at-
70 See, e.g., Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2nd
Cir. 1959); note 27 supra.
71 The cost of the transcript in the University of California proceedings
was $1300.00. Obviously, this is not to be taken as usaul, or even aver-
age, but it is significant. See Heyman, Some Thoughts on University
Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 74, 77 (1966).
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of the record may result in the sustention of the findings of fact by
the administrative tribunal.72 Few consider that the time required
for appeal73 and mootness74 of the question to be decided are im-
portant to the student or that an adverse but unproven mark of
bad conduct may reflect adversely upon the only asset that the
student owns-his intellectual and behavioral integrity.75 None of
the public university discipline cases considers that the students'
peculiar position within the university is also unique in that typ-
ically the student is not a person who is seeking or receiving gov-
ernment largess through the dole, but is oftentimes and in many
states a person who is either paying for a service in the form of
tuition or is in the intellectual market place bargaining a special
intellectual or artistic talent for scholarship, tuition rebate or grant-
in-aid which in turn adds to the creation of consortium between
faculty and student within the university.7
Neither do the education benefit cases clearly consider the
question of the separation of functions within the hearing tribunal.
Paradoxically, the college or university student who faces discipli-
nary proceedings for engaging publicly in a spirited protest move-
ment which to him is closely associated with a basic freedom may
ponder at his leisure the dilemma he faces when summoned before
an administrative tribunal which investigates, prefers and adjudi-
cates the charges against him.77 The activist student may well con-
72 See note 32 supra.
73 See Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1966) where the facts indicate
that the student missed at least two trimesters of school because he
elected to appeal through the administrative process.
74 Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964). Plaintiff was accused
of parading without a license and by reason thereof, she, with others,
was suspended for the rest of the year and was not permitted to grad-
uate with the class. The question was whether or not an order deny-
ing a temporary restraining order is a final decision and therefore
appealable under 28 U.S.C.A., § 1291. Ordinarily such a denial is not
a final order from which appeal will lie. However, the court held that
the posibility of mootness and the possibility of losing her remedy
prompts it to treat it as a final order. "If the suspension and expul-
sion order had remained in effect until an application for a preliminary
injunction had been heard and acted upon, the school term would
have expired. Linda Cal Woods and other of her class would not have
been promoted or graduated and the claims asserted would have
become nearly if not altogether moot." Id. at -.
75 See note 63 supra.
76 It is common knowledge that colleges and universities vie for students
of outstanding scholastic, artistic and athletic ability by offering
scholarship grants, grants in aid or other benefits in exchange for
their particular talent.
77 TIME, Jan. 19, 1968 at 34. Reporting the findings of a joint student-
faculty committee which was organized to study ways to avert campus
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sider the issue of combination of functions7s in its purely academic
rather than its legal context and may conclude that it permits of
less understanding of his predicament because of those same human
values 79 which brought him there and because the forum for the
college or university disciplinary hearing is found in a system
where little else may be provided or available.80
Analysis may suggest, however, that the question of separation
of functions in the university hearing becomes more complex for
the same reasons that other traditional administrative concepts do
not fit well into the forum. The public education benefit is exe-
cuted upon broad powers of delegation and subdelegation. It some-
times lacks any statutory definition which defines the rights of the
students. It has a certain internalness which distinguishes it from
the other forms of largess. The university is neither created nor
intended as an agency within the true meaning of the concept. It is
neither primarily nor secondarily concerned with either a legislative
or judicial function. It is concerned only with individuals who are
infinitely associated within the university complex. While it may
resemble the public welfare and public employment largess, it is
yet temporary and transitory to the people whom it affects. Of all
these distinctions it is the "internal" feature which best suggests
the need for independent judgment of the facts. Ordinarily the tra-
ditional reasons which speak for the administrative process as an
alternative means to pure judicial process may be the same reasons
which permit a combination of functions at the agency level. Those
motives may include combining legislative and judicial functions
to effect the purpose of the administrative tribunal by permitting
disorder on University of California campus. "On the key issue of how
the university should maintain order... asuming that dialogue will
not resolve all tensions-the report proposed that the chancellor
should not get directly involved with administering campus discipline.
Under the present system, it argued, the chancellor appears to be both
prosecutor and judge, which inevitably makes him seem like the
students' adversary."
78 See In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). "A fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case, and
no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome."
79 "The reason for the unsoundness of any such broadside condemnation
is that the principle which opposes the combination of functions has
to do with individuals, not with large and complex organizations."
2 K. DAVIS, ADMusTRA LAW TREATISE, § 13.01 at 172 (1958).
80 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
Compare In Re Schesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
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both the ascertainment of facts and limited policy-making. In addi-
tion, the combination of functions in its ordinary agency setting
involves the questions of expertise and dispatch in handling con-
troversies. The problem, however, is in attempting to delimit and
to separate the investigative, legislative, judicial and executory
functions by separating the pretense and performance of diverse
personalities rather than the functions within the administrative
process."'
While the foundation cases which invoke due process require-
ments as to combination of functions of an inferior tribunal involve
neither the revocation of a public benefit nor the pure administra-
tive law tribunal, they do provide the touchstone through which the
ground rules for college and university disciplinary proceedings
may be laid. 2
It has been suggested, however, that the distinction is not in
judging, but in advocating, and that the real test of validity is
whether or not, at the time of final decision, the hearing tribunal
is insulated from contamination by the advocates.83 The difficulty,
81 "It is only where there is a pretense of one personality, while in fact
there is the performance of another, that the action of a regulatory
agency with judicial functions becomes arbitrary, capricious and
unconstitutional," Atchison T. & S. F. Ry v. United States, 231 F. Supp.
422, 428 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
82 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), involving the combination of func-
tions of a mayor who tried prohibition act violations and whose com-
pensation was partially derived from the assessment of costs against
persons convicted, in addition to his regular salary as mayor. In Re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) involving the question of whether or
not a one man grand jury under the Michigan statutes could sit as a
trial court and hear the contempt citation charges against a person
accused of contempt at a previous hearing before the same magistrate,
sitting as a grand jury. Here the supreme court reversed the lower
court conviction for the reason that it was a denial of due process for
the trial court to try a case in which he was personally interested.
It is significant that the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter sug-
gests the court has imposed a more stringent requirement on state
court judges insofar as the separation of functions is concerned than
it had previously imposed on federal judges over which it exercises
supervisory power. This criticism is based on the fact that the court
in Murchison did not cite a previous contempt case, Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) where the contempt power of a federal trial
court judge was upheld. Neither case involved the separation of func-
tions of an administrative tribunal. Sacher is a federal court case
while Murchison is reviewed on certiorari from a state court. The
cases are better distinguished, however, when the court in Murchison
suggests that it is not considering the inherent power of a trial judge
to punish for contempt in open court as it did in Sacher. In this con-
nection, see McClelland v. Briscoe, 359 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. Civ. 1962).
83 2 K. DAVIS, ADmINSTRATIVE LAw TREATiSE, § 13.02 (Supp. 1965).
THOUGHTS ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 549
however, may be in determining who is an advocate and what is
advocacy at the final hearing. One state court has held that a law-
yer who investigated and initiated a proceeding to suspend a physi-
cian's license to practice in a hospital and who was present at the
executive determination of the board when the physician's license
was suspended, did not contaminate the board's power to suspend . 4
On the other hand, a lawyer who was a member of a board of
regents which inquired into the matter of terminating a tenured
professor's services and who acted as its chairman and participated
in the examination of the board's witness and cross examination of
the respondent's witnesses, was held to have contributed to the
contamination of the hearing.8 5 In an "exceptional case" on the
facts, it was held that a hearing examiner who was a member of
the commission and who had previously served as an investigator
for a division of the agency prior to his appointment and had inves-
tigated and discussed the case with the commission, had contami-
nated the hearing sufficiently to invoke federal jurisdiction by prior
restraint.8 6
84 Koelling v. Board of Trustees, 146 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1967).
85 State v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959). The court
indicated that mere combination of functions, standing alone was
insufficient to contaminate, but when taken with other objections
to the proceedings, there was sufficient grounds.
8 Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities Exch. Comm., 306 F.2d 260, (D.C. Cir.
1962). Cohen was an investigator for the corporate finance division
of the defendant SEC. He made an investigation and report and then
was appointed to the commission. Plaintiff attempted to have a revoca-
tion of license hearing discontinued for the fact that there was unlaw-
ful communication (ex parte) with regard to the case between the
staff and the commission. The court said: 'We are unable to accept
the view that a member of an investigative or prosecuting staff may
initiate an investigation, weigh its results, perhaps then recommend
the filing of charges, and then thereafter become a member of that
commission or angency, participate in adjudicatory proceedings, join
in commission or agency rulings and ultimately pass upon the pos-
sible amenability of the respondents to the administrative orders of
the commission or agency. So to hold, in our view, would be tanta-
mount to that denial of administrative due process against which
both the Congress and the courts have inveighed."
It would appear that the holding is exclusive of the provisions of the
federal administrative procedure act.
Compare Securities & Exch. Comm. v. R. A. Holman & Co., 323 F.2d
284 (D.C. Cir. 1963) which distinguishes "Treat" as the "exceptional
case."
In this line of federal cases, the effectual question may arise as to
what happens once the hearing is contaminated by a minority of the
board. For a case involving public statements as evidence of pre-
judging sufficient to invoke federal court jurisdiction and citing
"Treat", see Texaco v. F.T.C., 336 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965). The case points
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Emphasis may also be placed upon the interiority of the whole
administrative procedure, as well as upon the question of contami-
nation by the advocates. This concern may be more identifiable
with the university or college forum than with other statutory and
sophisticated administrative agencies where there are factual and
legal external checks and balances which are intended to insure
toward a modicum of impartiality. The internal nature of the
forum is suggested by observing the student who is, for all practical
purposes, part of the university complex, informed against by a
person associating with the administration as dean of students or
dean of men, appearing before a committee composed of persons
who, as faculty, students or administrators, are concerned with in-
terpreting and enforcing vague rules of student conduct which have
been formulated wholly within the university. Assuming some type
of "right" which may at that stage be entitled to consideration, 7 the
internalness of such a proceeding may be analagous to the case of
a Pennsylvania lawyer whose right to practice law came into ques-
tion because he was somehow associated with the Communist Party.
He was cited to appear before a bar association committee on offen-
ses, composed of lawyers who were jointly appointed by a president,
judge of the court and the county bar association. The court had
no difficulty in finding an objectionable combination of functions as
accuser, prosecurtor and judge which would vitiate the proceed-
ings. It said:
The Committee, as prosecutor, called and examined its witnesses
against the appellant and vigorously conducted an adversary pro-
ceeding against him before its own Subcommittee which, as judge,
presided over the hearings, passed upon the creditability of wit-
nesses, determined the inferences to be drawn from their testimony
and deduced therefrom the facts which it found.88
This is not to presume, however, that every proceeding will be,
or should be, voided simply because there is gross duality within
the functions of the administrative body. The sanctity of the pro-
ceeding may relate closely to the greater question of delegation
and the dilemma which may be encounterd if an invalidating com-
out the question as to whether federal jurisdiction should be invoked
when there is a denial of due process and whether the proceedings
should be vitiated or whether it should be remanded to the commis-
sion for further hearings without the presence of the offending com-
missioner.
87 See note 44 supra. "There is good reason now to expect that the trend
of judicial decision will reject the notion that a citizen surrenders his
civil rights upon enrollment as a student in the university." See
Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights and Responsi-
bilities, 54 CALI. L. REv. 23, 26 (1966).
s8 In Re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 597, 172 A.2d 835, 840 (1961).
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bination of functions is found. What then is to happen if the tri-
bunal is the only one which has authority to hear the matter, a
factor which is most likely in many university discipline cases?89
Who else is to hear? The reviewing court may find that there is no
alternative but to vindicate the jurisdiction of the hearing tribunal
and to search the appeal record for substantial error which would
require a reversal upon the record as a whole.90 An obvious preju-
dice occurs if no adequate record is made at the hearing level.
The appeal may be sufficient buffer to obliterate the stigma of
combined functions.91 But when applied to the university discipline
cases, the right of appeal may have to be found elsewhere than in
the rules of the university itself. It would be somewhat naive to
suggest that the rule making power of the university could confer
appellate jurisdiction on a court of record, and unless general admin-
istrative review is provided for without reference to the agency
which is affected, the right of appeal may not be available, and
would, therefore, not furnish the buffer for a tribunal which has
combined functions.
Statutory and other administrative rules which guarantee sepa-
ration of functions have been suggested. The first Model State
Administrative Procedure Act92 did not consider the question, but
it appears to be included in the Revised Model Act:
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized
by law, members or employees of an agency assigned to render a
89 Oftentimes the board or commission is the only body which has juris-
diction to hear matters of revocation and such jurisdiction should not
be vitiated merely because the statute authorizes both investigative
and judicial functions. State v. Board of Med. Exam., 135 Mont. 381,
339 P.2d 981 (1959); Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95
(4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959). Compare Bandeed
v. Howard, 299 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1956); cert. denied 355 U.S. 813 (1957)
with Board of Med. Exam. v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 102 A.2d 248(1954). (Where a case is returned to the tribunal after appeal and
the question of prior judging is raised, held: "[D]isqualification will
not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the prem-
ises.") Id. at 582, 102 A.2d at 252. See also Nider v. Homan, 32 Cal.
App.2d 11, 89 P.2d 135 (1939).
90 2 K. DAvis, ADmnSVTRAE LAW TPxASE, § 13.02 (1958).
91 "The basic idea that executive, legislative and judicial functions should
to a considerable extent be separated out from each other still prevails
in our dominant theoretical thinking, though in effecting it with refer-
ence to administrative agencies, we must rely in the final analysis upon
the check afforded by just such judicial review as herein attains."
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill.
1964). Cf. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); Ruse v. State
Bd. of Reg. for Healing Arts, 397 S.W. 2d 570 (Mo. 1965).
92 MODEL STATE ADn INISTRATE PRocEDuRE AcT. There is question, how-
ever, whether the original model act would apply to university discip-
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decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a
contested case shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in
connection with any issue of fact, with any person or party, nor,
in connection with any issue of law, with any party or his repre-
sentative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to
participate. An agency member
(1) may communicate with other members of the agency, and(2) may have the aid and advice of one or more personal assist-
ants.93
Pragmatically the Model Act does not express disdain for non-
separation of functions as being abhorrent to the agency concept.
Instead it appears to attempt a limitation upon its application by
prohibiting "communication" between agency members and parties
except upon notice and opportunity to be heard. Prohibiting com-
munication is obviously more restrictive than prohibiting participa-
tion by the advocates. When applied to the university disciplinary
scene, however, the problem may be more complex when it is to
be determined who is a party with whom communication is pro-
hibited. The person whose matriculation is affected is obviously a
"party" to the proceeding. His adversary is the university adminis-
tration, including the body politic whose function it is to determine
policy. It makes little difference whether the hearing is structured
within the definition of a statute which delegates authority or
whether it is merely ad hoc. It would be difficult to properly define,
delimit and enforce a rule which prohibits communication during
the investigation stage9 4 The suggestion that the real objection is
improper advocacy may retain its validity within this context.
linary hearings. The original model act defines an "agency" as:
"... any state (board, commission, department, or officer), authorized
by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except those in
the legislative or judicial branches, and except... (here insert the
names of any agencies such as the parole boards of certain states,
which, though authorized to hold hearings exercise purely discre-
tionary functions)." (emphasis added). Id. at § 1. There is consider-
able case law which indicates that the function of a state board of
regents in disciplinary matters is purely discretionary. It has been
suggested, however, that at least one state university is subject to
the provisions of the model act. Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed
from Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 45 (1966).
93 REVISED MODEL STATE ADmINISTRATIVE PROcEDuRE ACT, § 13.
94 The Revised Model Act has been criticized as being both too restrictive
and not restrictive enough. "Agency members, presiding officers, and
members of the agency's staff should be allowed to communicate with
each other, except that the Act should forbid communications between
those who are participating in the decision of a contested case and
staff members who in that case have participated in investigating,
prosecuting or advocating. In other respects, § 13 does not go far
enough. It should not only forbid insiders from improperly communi-
cating with outsiders, but it should also forbid outsiders from impro-
perly communicating with insiders. It must deal with communications
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Other proposals are less subtle:
The hearing committee should include faculty members or stu-
dents, or, if regularly included or requested by the accused, both
faculty and student members. No member of the hearing committee
who is otherwise interested in the particular case should sit injudgment during the proceeding. 95
The above joint proposal assumes that the committee is an ad
hoc committee within the university and appears to recognize a
lack of legislative or legislatively induced administrative standard
which would create a hearing tribunal. It identifies combination
of functions with personal "interest" which relates to the broader
question of bias at the hearing level. The question again is one of
definition and application of general standards to specific facts.
What kind of person is "otherwise interested?" The proposal ap-
pears self-inclusive and does not exclude either all faculty or all
students for that reason alone as being interested. However, some
faculty may be interested and some students may be interested for
varying reasons which may not be determined at the time of appoint-
ment. But this is surely not the "interest" intended. The proposal
suffers from the same type of vagueness that plagues university
rules of conduct in general.
Seemingly appropriate is the question of whether the courts,
the legislatures and the university administrators have performed
a disservice to the student by imposing the administrative agency
formula for expulsion proceedings without providing adequate
machinery to implement the hearings in a meaningful way. If so,
the reservations of the suspect student may be well founded when
he suddenly realizes that he is nowhere on the road to solving his
dilemma until he is in court, and then only if there is sufficient
record to sustain a finding that the authorities acted arbitrarily and
in both directions, not just in one direction. And to protect against
contamination of the judging function, something more than com-
munication must be dealt with; those who participate in the decision
must not be subordinate to those who participate in investigating,
prosecuting or advocating, except that agency members must have
ultimate responsibility for all functions." K. DAvis, CASES ADVINIsTRA-
7V LAW, 586 (2nd Ed. 1965).
95 A.A.U.P. Bull., 53 Winter 1967 365 at 368. The proposal is from a
Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students of the American
Association of University Professors, United States National Student
Association, Association of American Colleges, National Association of
Student Personnel Administrators, and National Association of Women
Deans and Counsellors. It has been officially endorsed by the United
States National Student Association and the Council of American
Association of University Professors. Cf. 54 CALiF. L. REv. 23 at 37, 38(1966); 18 VANW. L. Rlv. 819 (1965).
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capriciously. Perhaps both he and the university may be prejudiced
by ad hoc committee hearings which do not provide for a record or
which do not compel the attendance of witnesses.9 6
Application of other present alternatives may be no more ade-
quate. It has been lightly suggested that enrollment in a constitu-
tionally appointed university is akin to the creation of a trustee-
cestui que trust relationship for the benefit of the student.9 7 While
the possibilities and options of enforcing student rights under such
a theory are intriguing, adherence to the suggestion quite obviously
enhances the en loco parentis concept of student-university rela-
tions, a concept which is currently in disfavor.9 8 Yet it can be
96 This is not to assume that an individual litigant in an administrative
hearing has a right to compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in the absence of a statute granting it. Misouri v. North,
271 U.S. 40 (1926). Contra, Jewell v. McCann, 95 Ohio St. 191, 116
N.E. 42 (1917). But it would seem that here again the internal nature
of the university complex has some bearing on the subject. Witnesses,
either faculty or students, as well as the parties are closely associated
with the university. It is conceivable that either faculty or students
might be reluctant to come forward for fear of possible recrimination.
See State v. McPhee, 6 Wis.2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959) where it was
held that a hearing examiner is required by the duties of his office to
protect the witneses from possible reprisals.
97 The California Constitution provides that "the University of California
shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing
corporation known as the Regents of the University of California, with
full powers of organization and government, subject only to such
legislative control as may be necessary to insure compliance with the
terms of the endowment of the university and the security of its funds."
CAL. CONST., A. art. IX, § 9. See Goldberg v. Board of Regents of U. of
Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). This issue was raised but passed over by
the Illinois court's brief but interesting language in Tinkoff v. North-
western Uni., 333 Ill. App. 224, 232, 77 N.E.2d 345, (1948). "Plaintiff
has no right based upon a trust relationship with the University.
Tinkoff, Jr., did not become a beneficiary upon compliance with the
entrance requirements. We think he remained at most a potential
beneficiary until he was actually admitted." Quaere: Tinkoff involves
pre-admission issues? Would his status as a beneficiary change after
he had been admitted. See note 44 supra.
98 It is interesting to sepculate as to how much influence the doctrine
has on the administrative agency concept, or less formally, the "little
family conference" within the university. It has been suggested that
for constitutional purposes, the better approach as indicated in Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); recognizes
that state universities should no longer stand en loco parentis in rela-
tion to their students. Cf. 2 LAW IN TRANsImoN QuARTmLY 1, 17 (1965).
Quaere: Does this free the student to accept what remedies are avail-
able? With the descension of the doctrine, should not the "little fam-
ily conference" go also? Does this tend toward hardening of the
categories? It was made clear in Dixon that a full-dress judicial
hearing with the right to cross-examine the witnesses was not re-
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argued that the en loco parentis doctrine is encouraged by the chary
attitude of the courts in their reluctance to impose judicial over-
sight upon university discipline. No court has seriously considered
the trustee-cestui que trust relationship, and it is probable that the
proper interpretation of the university as a trustee refers only to
the operation of the facilities rather than the custody and control of
rnatriculants.9
Legislative and administrative proposals have been suggested,
proposals which suggest adherence to the agency concept within
the university and which advocate firming up the mechanics of the
hearing procedures to conform to due process. 00 Yet these pro-
posals do not consider the unique position of the student in matters
of time, transiency or the fact that the typical student is usually a
person who has given a quid pro quo for the experiences associated
quired, and that the attending publicity and disturbance of university
activitities might be detrimental to the educational atmosphere of the
university and impractical to carry out.
99 See note 96 supra.
100 Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights and Responsibili-
ties, 54 CALUF. L. REv. 23 at 37, 38 (1966) (suggesting that rules be
written with precision and without ambiguity-that they be publi-
cized to assure that their existence and content is brought home to
those affected-that enforcement proceedings be preceded by notice
and statement of charges, together with information of procedures-
that prompt hearings be had with the opportunity to question wit-
nesses against the accused and to call witnesses on his own behalf-the
right to counsel be provided-that a record be kept to show com-
pliance with all the requirements of due process-that the findings
and recommendations be in writing with a copy furnished to the
accused); Comment, 18 VAmn. L. REV. 819 (1965) which, in addition
to those mentioned above, suggests the expression of university policy
-that the college and university officials be given express power to
formulate and enforce rules of student conduct which are appropriate
and necessary to the maintenance of order and propriety-that no
rules be imposed which place restrictions on a student's conduct
which are not necessary to further the school's educational goals or
which restrict the student's freedom of expression on matters of social
and moral significance-an exhaustion of administrative remedies be
required-that the type of hearing be judged by the gravamen of the
offense-the right to appeal and the review court be limited to ade-
quacy of hearing unless there is a showing of bad faith, in which case
the court would have jurisdiction to determine the case on its merits);
A.A.U.P. Bull. 53 Winter 1967 365 at 368 (which provides, in addition
to those mentioned above, that the hearing committee be comprised
of faculty members or students, or both-that the burden of proof
be upon those officials bringing the charge-that all matters upon
which the decision is based be based upon evidence introduced at the
hearing-that if there is no transcript there be at least a tape record-
ing of the hearing-that the decision of the hearing committee be final
"subject only to the student's right of appeal to the president or ulti-
mately to the governing board of the institution").
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with matriculation. The latter observation gives rise to a third
alternative-of fashioning the courts' analysis of the relationships
between students and public universities after the contractual rela-
tionship between students and private eleemosynary institutions.
Distinctions between private and public higher education should
be sought elsewhere than in the relationship between the student
and the university' 1' and there is little reason for the courts to treat
the relationship of a student to a private university as contractual'012
and to a public university as merely beneficial.10 3 Public universi-
ties like private institutions contract for facilities, services, equip-
ment and personnel, and in some cases students. While the result
in a given case may not be appreciably different by seeking other
means of redress, the student whose presence in the university is
threatened is interested in having his rights determined in a forum
which will give him final, summary, complete and impartial relief
at the least expense. The obvious advantage to be gained is that
the court, aided by formal means of compulsion to arrive at the
truth, may be permitted to make a factual determination as to
whether the conditions of continued enrollment have been per-
formed. On the other hand, reservations imposed by the contract
may limit the courts' inquiry to the question of whether or not the
administrative discretion has been abused,'0 a limitation which
seems to be imposed from the courts' traditional attitude toward
university discipline.
As the vigor of the American public university students' con-
cern for matters of social and national significance grows, so grows
his insistence upon being included in the policy-making and admin-
istrative processes within the university. If this insistence is based
upon a responsible desire to be made a partner in the total learning
101 But cf. People v. Northwestern Univ., 396 Ill. 233, 71 N.E.2d 156; 333
Ill. App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948).
102 See, e.g., DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957);
Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Booker v. Grand
Rapids Med. Coll., 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909); State v. Lincoln
Med. Coll., 81 Neb. 533, 116 N.W. 294 (1908) (A case which is very
descriptive of the posible autocracy of the faculty and the need for
court intervention); Carr v. St. John's U., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962);
Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435, 224 App. Div. 487 (1928);
Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr Coll., 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923);
State v. Milwaukee Med. Coll., 128 Wis. 7, 106 N.W. 116 (1906).
103 See notes 7, 9 & 44 supra.
104 See Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1958). An older
comment suggests that the contractual theory gives the colleges less
absolute power, "but in practice courts interfere only where there has
been a palpalable abuse of the wide discretion possessed by the authori-
ties." Comment, 77 PENN. L. REV. 694, 695 (1928).
THOUGHTS ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 557
process; and if the student's attitude is that the central administra-
tion is merely functionary to that end, then it would seem that the
lines of responsibility should be redrawn in more concise and exact-
ing terms. Ideally the student will become more altruistic in his
fealty toward the total educational process, and the university will
assume the position that it owes the student something other than
a promise of procedural safeguards which are guaranteed and en-
forced elsewhere. Ideally that condition would obviate the need
for any adversary type hearing within the university. Pending the
millenium, however, the administrative process will suffice provided
legislative enactments define procedures and standards in more
precise terms, terms which insure the student a fair hearing before
an impartial tribunal in the shortest possible time at the least pos-
sible cost. If not, other alternatives seem somehow appropriate.
